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ARTICLES
THE CHAPTER 13 ALTERNATIVE: A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION TO UNDERSECURED HOME MORTGAGES
The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Great Recession that began in approximately 2008 brought
severe financial difficulties to a large number of homeowners in
the United States. With a rise in the unemployment rate from
4.6% to 10%,' many lost their jobs and their ability to make their
home payments. At the same time, with an average 30.3% reduc-
tion in housing values' (which in some places has approached
nearly 60%),' many homes are now worth substantially less than
* Judge Bufford served as a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge in Los Angeles for twenty-five
years until his retirement in 2010. He is now a Distinguished Scholar in Residence at
Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University.
1. According to the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
unemployment rates rose from 4.6% in January 2007 to a peak of 10% in December 2009.
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 07-0159, THE EMPLOY-
MENT SITUATION: JANUARY 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_02022007.pdf (noting an unemployment rate of 4.6% in January 2007);
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 09-1583, THE EMPLOYMENT
SITUATION-DECEMBER 2009, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ar
chives/empsit_- 01082010.pdf (noting an unemployment rate of 10% in December 2009).
2. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, U.S. Home Prices Keep Weakening as Nine Ci-
ties Reach New Lows According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://standardandpoors.comlindices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices
/en/us/?indexld=spusa-cashpidff--p--us (explaining that the 30.3% value reflects the reduc-
tion in housing values from their peak value in 2006 through November 2010).
3. Id. (noting that Las Vegas has seen the greatest decline in housing values since
2006).
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the debt owed on mortgages secured by the homes.4 Some 5 mil-
lion homeowners are at least two months behind in their mort-
gage payments, and RealtyTrac predicts that some 1.2 million
homes will be foreclosed on in 2011. The housing crisis continues
to get worse, not better.6
Large amounts of public funds, through a variety of programs,
have been expended to try to ameliorate this problem, with dis-
appointing results.' The federal Home Affordable Modification
Program ("HAMP") alone, for example, has been allocated $50 bil-
lion of U.S. government funds, of which $652.4 million has been
expended to produce a meager 520,000 permanent modifications.8
However, none of these government programs has made a sub-
stantial dent in the backlog of 11.1 million homes that are under
water where homeowners cannot make their mortgage pay-
4. See Nick Timiraos, U.S. News: Home-Purchasing Power Increases, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 9, 2011, at A4. As of the end of 2009, nearly 27% of all U.S. homeowners owed more
on their mortgages than their homes were worth. Id.
5. Janna Herron, Banks Repossessed 1 Million Homes Last Year-and 2011 Will Be
Worse, MSNBC.coM, Jan. 13, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41051419/ns/business-
real-estate/.
6. Residential foreclosures are predicted to increase by 20% in 2011. Dan Levy &
Prashant Gopal, Foreclosure Filings in U.S. May Jump 20% from Record 2010 as Crisis
Peaks, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 13, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-13u-s-foreclo
sure-filings-may-jump-20-this-year-ds-crisis-peaks.html.
7. Created during the second Bush administration, the Hope for Homeowners Pro-
gram and FHASecure (discontinued Dec. 31, 2008), as well as President Obama's Making
Homes Affordable Program, were meant to encourage lenders to voluntarily modify mort-
gages held by certain qualified debtors. HOPE for Homeowners Program, 24 C.F.R. § 257
(2010); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Bush Admin. to Help Nearly
One-Quarter of a Million Homeowners Refinance, Keep Their Homes; FHA to implement
new "FHASecure" refinancing product (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://archives.hud.
gov/news/2007/pr07-123.cfm; Press Release, Making Homes Affordable Program, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, U.S. Dep't Of Hous. & Urban Dev. & The Ad Council Unveil Nat'l
PSA Campaign To Raise Awareness Of Making Home Affordable Program (July 28, 2010),
available at http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/news/latest/Pages/pr_-07282010.aspx.
HOPE NOW is a prominent non-governmental modification program administered by the
mortgage industry. Press Release, HOPE NOW, HOPE NOW: Mortgage Servicers Com-
pleted 101,000 Loan Mods for Homeowners in January (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://
www.hopenow.com/press-releases.php.
8. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: A REVIEW OF
TREASURY'S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS, 16 n.23, 18, 44 n.114 (2010) ("To date,
HAMP has processed 519,648 permanent modifications.").
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ments.9 Home prices are expected to decline another 5-10% be-
fore they reach bottom near the end of 2011.o
In addition, interest rates for secured credit have lowered dra-
matically, making home ownership much more affordable for a
given income level and debt service capacity." However, a home-
owner whose property value is less than the outstanding mort-
gage loans (or if the property value is near this demarcation line)
has typically been shut out of the opportunity to refinance to re-
duce home mortgage costs.12 In many such cases, the refinancing
of the mortgage debt would make the mortgage payments afford-
able instead of putting them beyond an owner's reach.
Nonetheless, there are a substantial number of homes where
the owners could make the payments with appropriate mortgage
payment modifications. Such a modification would (a) reduce the
amount of the secured debt to the reduced value of the house, (b)
reduce the interest rate to the current interest rate, (c) change
any adjustable rate to a fixed rate, and (d) adjust the monthly
payments correspondingly.
This article discusses minor changes to the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code that would make these changes possible."3 These changes
would make avoiding foreclosure possible for a homeowner who
(a) is presently not able to make the mortgage service payments
but (b) could make payments for a mortgage that is reduced to
the market value of the property and to a fixed market mortgage
rate. The article does not address the political issue of what pro-
9. See Ruth Simon & Nick Timiraos, Mortgage Faceoff Looms for Lenders, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 28, 2011, at C1.
10. Timiraos, supra note 4 (stating that many economists expect that home prices will
decline by 5% to 10% before bottoming out in late 2011 or early 2012).
11. See Primary Mortgage Market Survey: 30-year Fixed-Rate Mortgages Since 1971,
FREDDIE MAc, http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011)
(displaying that interest rates on thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages have fallen from an an-
nual average of 6.03% in 2008 to an annual average of 4.69% in 2010).
12. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Home-
owners: Avoiding a New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan
Modifications, 51 SANTA CIARA L. REV. 153, 168-69 (2011); Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zin-
gales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 AM. L. & EcON. R. 575, 577
(2009); Manuel Adelino et al., Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Re-
defaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, No. 09-4, 2009).
13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006).
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tections Congress might decide to provide to mortgage owners
and servicers as a part of such legislation. 4
A highly important advantage of such legislation is that it
would preserve the principle embodied in bankruptcy law-that
the private sector should bear the economic losses resulting from
financial adversity. Through and through, bankruptcy law sits on
the solid rock that private economic losses should be kept private:
government money should not be used to bail out private econom-
ic adversities. As the experience of the last few years has demon-
strated, a breach of this principle can lead (as it has led) to a vast
depletion of public resources to support private investment, at the
cost of creating a scarcity of funds for other public purposes (or
alternatively, a vast impairment of the public credit of the gov-
ernment).
Other advantages of adopting this revision to the Bankruptcy
Code would also arise. The main advantage is that it would per-
mit the clearing of a substantial segment of the market of nonper-
forming mortgage loans and the resulting processes of foreclosure
and resale. These processes are very cumbersome and inefficient.
They result in the realization of prices substantially lower than
could be achieved in a market where a private (usually resident)
owner of a home sells it to a buyer who also expects to reside in
it." Further, this proposal could substantially ameliorate the now
depressed housing market that is dominated by the sale of forec-
losed homes by institutions at prices substantially lower than the
prices of private home sales." At the same time, as Professor
Adam Levitin has shown, this change in Chapter 13 will have lit-
tle or no impact on mortgage credit cost or availability."
14. For draft legislation of this type, see, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes Act
of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. § 103 (1st Sess. 2009). While several bills have included
such a proposal, none is a clean bill that would enact only this proposal. Further, none has
been enacted.
15. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages
in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 603-06 (2009).
16. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Homes Account for 25 Percent of All
Q3 2010 Residential Sales (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/
press-releases/foreclosure-homes-account-for-25-percent-of-all-q3-2010-residential-sales-
6194.
17. See Levitin, supra note 15, at 599, 601-02.
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II. CHAPTER 13
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 as
part of a thoroughgoing revision to the U.S. bankruptcy law.'
Generally, Chapter 7 provides for the orderly liquidation of deb-
tors with insufficient assets to pay their creditors in full.19 Chap-
ter 11 provides for the reorganization of individuals and busi-
nesses pursuant to a plan voted on by the creditors.2 0 Chapter 9
provides for the reorganization of certain municipalities." Chap-
ter 12 was added in 1986 to provide for the adjustment of debts of
family farmers2 2 (and, beginning in 2005, for family fishermen).2'
Chapter 15 was added in 2005 to provide for the coordination of
international insolvency cases.2 4 Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the
Bankruptcy Code contain general provisions applicable to all
kinds of bankruptcy cases (with certain exceptions).25
A. The General Scope of Chapter 13
Chapter 13, which provides generally for the adjustment of
debts of individuals with regular income, is best understood as an
alternative to a consumer Chapter 7 case.
The basic structure of a consumer Chapter 7 case is that an
"honest but unfortunate" debtor gives up all non-exempt proper-
ty26 (if any) in which the debtor has an interest on the date of
18. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, ch. 13, 92 Stat. 2549,
2645-51 (codified in scattered sectiosn of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The 1978 amendments
went into force on October 1, 1979. See Martin I. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (1979). The prior law had a Chapter 13 that had similarities
to the present Chapter 13, but it was different in many material respects. Id. at 17-18.
19. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2006).
20. See id. §§ 1101-1174.
21. See id. §§ 901-946.
22. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105-14 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (2006)).
23. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, § 1007, 119 Stat. 23, 187-88 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
24. See id. § 801, 119 Stat. 23, 134-45 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2006)).
25. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-562. There is no Chapter 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, or 14. These chapters
are saved for use, if needed, in subsequent bankruptcy legislation.
26. For property exemptions applicable to individuals, see id. § 522. Alternatively, in §
522(b)(2), Congress authorized any state to opt out of the federal exemption provisions and
to substitute its own state law exemptions. Some thirty-three states have exercised this
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the bankruptcy filing in exchange for a discharge28 of all unse-
cured debts29 and a fresh start in economic life." In a Chapter 7
case, the debtor is permitted to keep all postpetition earnings and
other postpetition property. 1
By contrast, in a Chapter 13 case, the debtor keeps all of her32
prepetition property and in exchange makes monthly payments
through a Chapter 13 plan for three to five years, which must to-
tal at least as much as the creditors would receive in a Chapter 7
case.3 These payments go to a Chapter 13 trustee, who distri-
butes them to the creditors according to the Chapter 13 plan ap-
proved by the court.34
Chapter 13 is inspired by Chapter 11, which provides for the
reorganization of a business and the payment of its debts pur-
option. See WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III & NANCY FRAAS
MACLEAN, BANKR. EXEMPTION MVANUAL § 4:2 (2010 ed.).
27. In fact, approximately 93% of Chapter 7 cases are "no asset" cases where the trus-
tee finds no property to administer for the benefit of creditors. See Dali6 Jiminez, The Dis-
tribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 797
(2009).
28. The Chapter 7 discharge is provided by § 727. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). This section
provides for the denial of a discharge for a Chapter 7 debtor for certain misconduct, chiefly
within the bankruptcy case itself. See id. In addition, certain prepetition debts are not
subject to the discharge. See id. § 523.
29. See id. §§ 523, 727(b). While Chapter 7 provides for the discharge of all debts, the
collateral for any secured debt (typically a house or a car) remains liable for the debt. See
id. § 524(e). In consequence, as a practical matter a Chapter 7 discharge discharges all
unsecured debt and the debtor remains liable for house and car payments.
30. See, e.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367, 381 (2007) (quot-
ing Grogan v. Garner, 488 U.S. 279, 286, 287 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted) (stating
that the basic purpose of bankruptcy is to give "a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate
debtor.").
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (6). There is a minor exception that, in a Chapter 7 case,
any inheritance, life insurance proceeds (from a decedent), or marital property settlement
received by the debtor within 180 days after filing also becomes property of the estate and
available for liquidation and distribution to creditors. See id. § 541(a)(5). It is very un-
common for a Chapter 7 debtor to receive property of this type.
32. While the pronoun "her" is used as a convention in legal scholarship, in fact a ma-
jority of Chapter 13 debtors are women. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women's
Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 27 n.40 (2002) (giving data to show that, in 2001, 71% of individual con-
sumer (and all Chapter 13) bankruptcy cases were filed either by women alone (39%) or as
joint petitions (32%)). It is a fair inference that women were debtors in a majority of the
Chapter 13 cases included in that sample.
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4); Levitin, supra note 15, at 579.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 132 2 (a)(1); see id. § 1302 (describing the appointment and tasks of the
trustee).
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suant to a plan over a course of years.35 A Chapter 13 debtor must
have regular income." The debtor must propose a feasible plan
for the adjustment of debts within fourteen days after the filing of
the case. 37 A Chapter 13 plan deals with unsecured debt by pro-
viding for the debtor to make such payments as the debtor can af-
ford and discharging any unpaid balance at the end of the plan
after the debtor makes the plan payments ("unsecured creditor
treatment")." The unsecured creditors receive payments from the
trustee (who passes them on from the debtor) as provided in the
Chapter 13 plan.39 In due course, a Chapter 13 debtor receives a
discharge of all unsecured debts (unless the plan provides other-
wise). 40
Secured creditors are treated quite differently from unsecured
creditors under a Chapter 13 plan. A Chapter 13 plan typically
has two separate provisions for secured debt. First, the plan typi-
cally provides for the cure of any arrearages (i.e., missed pay-
ments) on a secured debt and the payment of the regular monthly
(or other periodic) payments for the life of the plan and thereafter
until the debt is paid in full41 ("secured creditor treatment").42
Second, if the secured creditor is undersecured (i.e., the value
of the collateral is less than the unpaid amount on the debt), the
debt is divided into two parts. 43 The secured portion is given se-
cured creditor treatment (i.e., arrearages are cured and regular
monthly payments are made for the life of the plan and until the
debt is retired).4 4 The unsecured portion is given unsecured credi-
tor treatment, which usually means that it is paid a much lower
percentage (and perhaps nothing at all).
35. See id. § 1123; see also Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/bankruptcy/bankruptcybasics/chapter
11.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2011)).
36. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West 2011).
37. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2006).
39. See id. § 1326(a)(2).
40. See id. § 1328(a).
41. In certain cases the secured debt (such as a car loan) may be paid in full according
to its terms before the end of the Chapter 13 plan. See id. § 1322(b)(5).
42. See id.
43. See id. § 506(a)(1).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Chapter 13 secured debt modifications are limited by federal
bankruptcy common law. A modified loan must provide a reason-
able risk premium for the debtor,46 and the plan must provide for
the secured creditor to receive the present value of its collateral.4 7
Only a debtor who can afford a loan within these limits can quali-
fy for the modification of a loan under Chapter 13.48 In addition, a
debtor must undertake a plan requiring the debtor to live at or
near the poverty level for three to five years (mostly five years in
the present economic environment) to qualify for a Chapter 13
discharge that would accomplish the changes described.4 9
It is likely that a substantial number of homeowners whose
property is undersecured and who cannot afford their present
payment schedules would qualify for such a Chapter 13 plan.
There are no estimates as to how many undersecured debtors
would qualify for Chapter 13 treatment. This figure likely in-
cludes a substantial portion of those with undersecured mortgag-
es who are presently unable to make their payments, but proba-
bly far less than half. Nonetheless, this group would have
substantial size.
B. Chapter 13 Treatment of Debts Secured by Automobiles
The most common kind of secured debt in a Chapter 13 case is
a debt secured by an automobile." In virtually every case where
the debtor has such a loan, the collateral is worth less than the
amount owing on the debt." Until 2005, the foregoing description
of the treatment of an undersecured creditor was the typical pat-
tern for the treatment of automobile loans in Chapter 13 cases:
the secured debt was written down to the value of the automobile
and paid over the life of the plan until the debt was paid in full
(whether before or after the completion of the plan), and the un-
46. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (discussing the factors used
to determine the size of a risk adjustment).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
48. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West 2011).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
50. See generally David Gray Carlson, Cars and Homes in Chapter 13 After the 2005
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 301, 302 (2006) (dis-
cussing secured car lenders and home mortgage lenders in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases).
51. See id.
1098 [Vol. 45:1091
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secured portion of the debt was paid at the same rate as other un-
secured creditors.52
In 2005, Congress changed Chapter 13 so that it now prohibits
the bifurcation of a debt secured by an automobile if the debtor
has not owned the vehicle for at least 910 days before the date of
filing the bankruptcy petition. Under Chapter 13 as modified, a
vehicle owned no more than 910 days is treated as fully secured
and must be given secured creditor treatment under the plan.54
Other vehicles are treated the same as all other secured debt (ex-
cept for principal home mortgages) described above.
C. Chapter 13 Treatment of Debt Secured by the Debtor's
Principal Residence
Chapter 13 singles out home mortgages for special treatment.e
Unlike all other secured debt held by a Chapter 13 debtor (except
for certain automobiles since 2005), a Chapter 13 plan may not
modify the rights of a holder of a secured claim "secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal res-
idence."5 ' Notwithstanding this prohibition, the plan may provide
for the curing of any default "within a reasonable time" and
maintenance of payments during the life of the plan.
Thus a Chapter 13 plan may provide for the payment of se-
cured debts owing by the debtor according to the following pat-
tern. The debtor may pay arrearages over the life of the plan (up
to five years), except that arrearages on a mortgage secured by
52. Id. Other secured debt in a Chapter 13 case may be collateralized with appliances,
jewelry, investment property, a vacation home, or electronic equipment. See 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Co., 895 F.2d 123, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1990) (ap-
pliances and furniture). All such debts are subject to the same treatment in a Chapter 13
case as a car loan before 2005; Carlson, supra note 50, at 302-04.
53. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, § 306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)).
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
55. Id.
56. See id. § 1322(b)(2). In 1994 Congress added § 1123(b)(5) to prohibit the modifica-
tion of a mortgage secured by a debtor's principal residence in a Chapter 11 case. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 206, 108 Stat. 4106, 4123 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5)).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
58. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
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the debtor's principal residence must be paid within "a reasonable
time" (which is typically less than five years). 9
III. THE CHAPTER 13 PROPOSAL
Given this description of the treatment of undersecured debts
in a Chapter 13 plan, we now turn to the proposal to permit a
debtor to use a Chapter 13 case to modify an undersecured home
loan to make it affordable. The main purpose of this article is to
describe in detail how Chapter 13 would need to be changed to
accomplish such a modification and to specify exact language that
would accomplish such a change.
A. Chapter 13 Background
Until recently, there was relatively little pressure to change
the special treatment of home mortgages in Chapter 13 cases.
Apart from specific markets, the value of personal residences had
never depreciated more than 10% since the Great Depression.o
At the same time, until the 1990s, it was customary for residen-
tial mortgages to require a down payment of at least 10%." Thus,
it was unusual for a home mortgage holder to become underse-
cured. While the recent advent of mortgages with lower down
payments produced an occasional Chapter 13 case with an under-
secured home mortgage holder, this was relatively uncommon.
Even junior mortgage holders were typically "in the money" in
Chapter 13 cases.62
59. See, e.g., United Ca. Say. Bank v. Martin (In re Martin), 156 B.R. 47, 50 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1999) (stating that while "reasonable time ... is a flexible concept, determined on
a case-by-case basis," "reasonable time" is limited to three years "unless the court ap-
proves a longer period not to exceed five years."); In re Harmon, 72 B.R. 458, 462 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987).
60. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Con-
glomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 967
(2009); see also David C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Les-
sons from the Great Depression, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 133, 145 (2008),
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/05/Wheelock.pdf.
61. Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis-Some Thoughts on a "Sustainable" and
"Organic"Regulatory System, 4 FLA. INT'L U.L. REV. 381, 385 n.22 (2009).
62. See Dennis Cauchon, Why Home Values May Take Decades to Recover, USA
TODAY, Dec. 12, 2008, http://liusatoday.net/news/graphics/housing-prices/home-prices.pdf.
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The advent of the Great Recession, beginning in 2008, changed
this picture dramatically. Since that date, U.S. homes have de-
preciated by an average of 30.3%." In some markets, the reduc-
tion in home values has approached 60%.64 This change has made
a large number of mortgages undersecured. In addition, the un-
employment rate rose from 4.6% to 10%, which left many home-
owners unable to pay their mortgages.es
At the same time, the average interest rate for home mortgages
dropped drastically. In 2008, the average rate for a home mort-
gage was 6.03%." At the end of 2010, it had fallen to 4.69%."
However, a very large number of homeowners have been unable
to refinance their homes to take advantage of the lower rates, be-
cause they cannot provide an equity cushion for a new mort-
gage.6 8
The development of the securitization market for home mort-
gages has added to this problem. Securitization has stratified the
home mortgage market so that mortgage holders are contractual-
ly prohibited from making substantial modifications to home
mortgages, and their counterparties are too numerous and dis-
persed to make any efficient modification.6 ' This securitization
has created a collective action problem that bankruptcy law is un-
iquely designed to solve in ordinary circumstances.
B. The Chapter 13 Proposal
In light of these problems, this article describes a Chapter 13
modification that provides an alternative procedure for modifying
an undersecured consumer mortgage.o The mortgage would be
63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 11.
67. See supra note 11.
68. See Crespi, supra note 12, at 169-70.
69. See Adam J. Levitin, Helping Homeowners: Modification of Mortgages in Bank-
ruptcy, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. ONLINE, Jan. 19, 2009, at 1, 3-5, http://hlpronline.com/
LevitinHLPR_011909.pdf.
70. Several bills have been introduced in Congress that would, inter alia, adopt some
of the recommendations made here. See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes in
Bankruptcy Act of 2008, S. 2136, 110th Cong. § 102 (2007); Home Owners' Mortgage and
Equity Savings (HOMES) Act, S. 2133, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); Emergency Home Owner-
2011]1 1101
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
written down to the fair market value of the property (the deb-
tor's home) serving as collateral for the loan. The unsecured por-
tion of the loan would be given the same treatment as other unse-
cured debt in the Chapter 13 plan. The interest rate would be
reduced to the present market rate (for a borrower with the credit
standing of the Chapter 13 debtor)." If the debtor completes the
payments under the plan, the unsecured portion of the debt (the
portion not supported with collateral) would be discharged
through the Chapter 13 discharge. The collective action problem
is solved by requiring all parties in interest to negotiate their in-
terests in a bankruptcy forum.72
To permit a Chapter 13 debtor to make such a change in her
mortgage, three alterations in the language of § 1322(b), plus one
in § 1322(c), are required.
1. First Change: Amend the Language of § 1322(b)(2)
The first change is to amend subsection (b)(2) as follows:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan
may-
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
laim secutred only be a seecurity interest in real property that is
the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims,
or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims....
2. Second Change: Add New Provision § 1322(b)(6)
To make the change to § 1322(b)(2) effective and to assure that
the intention of this change is realized (and to overrule contrary
ship and Mortgage Equity Protection of 2007, H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. None has been
enacted.
71. For an explanation of the calculation of an appropriate interest rate in the bank-
ruptcy context, see Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 478-81 (2004).
72. See, e.g., Susan E. Hauser, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Case for Allowing Mod-
ification of Home Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207, 225 (2010).
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case law), it is necessary to add a new provision inspired by
Chapter 11:
(6) provide for the extension of the maturity date beyond the
date when the final payment on the plan is due or change the in-
terest rate or other terms of a secured claim....
The remaining subparagraphs of § 1322(b) should be renum-
bered to provide for the insertion of subparagraph (6).
3. Third Change: Two Technical Amendments
As a result of the change in subparagraph (2), two references in
§ 1322 to the deleted clause need to be removed. Thus subpara-
graph (5) should be amended as follows:
(5) netwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subseetion, provide
for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and main-
tenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured
claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the
date on which the final payment under the plan is due ....
Similarly, subparagraph (c) should be amended as follows:
(c) Notwithstanding subseetion (b)(2) and applicable nonban-
kruptcy law....
Pursuant to amended § 1322, as described above, a debtor
would be authorized to bifurcate an undersecured mortgage
claim. In consequence, the debtor would become responsible only
for the value of the allowed secured claim (the value of the colla-
teral), and would pay the remainder at the rate provided in the
plan for unsecured creditors." The plan of reorganization would
then be required to provide at least for the payment of the
present value of the allowed secured claim, not the entire under-
73. While a number of Chapter 13 plans provide that general unsecured creditors be
paid little or nothing, a substantial number of Chapter 13 plans provide for the payment of
all unsecured creditors in full over the life of the plan. See William C. Whitford, The Ideal
of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer
Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 405 (1994). Another substan-
tial segment provides for the payment of 70% of unsecured debts (so that the debtor can
qualify for a hardship discharge under § 1328(b), if it becomes applicable during the life of
the plan). See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2006) (discussing when a court may grant a hardship
discharge to a debtor).
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lying lien, taking into account the length of the mortgage agree-
ment and adjusting payments to reflect an interest rate deter-
mined by the national prime rate adjusted by the risk of a debtor
default under the plan.7 4 The amount of the underlying lien ex-
ceeding the value of the collateral (the allowed unsecured claim)
would be treated like any other general unsecured claim." Be-
cause present law permits debtors to offer plans-and courts to
confirm plans-that cram down undersecured claims (except
those secured by the debtor's principal residence or a recently
purchased automobile), amending § 1322 will not fundamentally
change or affect the administration of the Bankruptcy Code.
C. Explanation of the Proposal
The first change is the substantive change in Chapter 13. It de-
letes the provision prohibiting a Chapter 13 plan from modifying
a claim secured only by a security interest in the debtor's princip-
al residence and permits a Chapter 13 plan to include such a
modification."
The second change, the addition of a new § 1322(b)(6), is re-
quired to reverse case law interpreting § 1322. None of the con-
gressional bills has addressed this issue. The leading opinion
needing reversal to implement this proposal is Enewally v. Wash-
ington National Bank (In re Enewally) from the Ninth Circuit."
In that case, the debtor owned two rental properties, and the se-
cured creditor was undersecured as to each." The Chapter 13
74. See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii); Till, 541 U.S. at 478-81.
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). Unsecured creditors in Chapter 7 frequently receive
payment on a very small percentage of their claim, or nothing at all. Id. §§ 507(a), 726(a),
727(a). As a practical result of this provision, it is quite possible that a Chapter 13 debtor
will have to devote very few or no funds to the repayment of general unsecured claims that
are not entitled to priority. Id. §§ 507, 1322(a)(2).
76. It could be argued that § 1123(b)(5), which is identical to § 1322(b)(2), should also
be amended to delete the same phrase. Compare id. § 1123(b)(5) (providing that a Chapter
11 bankruptcy plan may not modify a claim secured by a security interest in real proper-
ty), with id. § 1322(b)(2) (providing that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan may not modify a
claim secured by a security interest in real property). Section 1123(b)(5) was borrowed
from Chapter 13 when it was added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1994. See Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 206, 108 Stat. 4106, 4123 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(b)(5)). This issue is beyond the scope of this article.
77. 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004).
78. Id. at 1167. The debtor also had a principal residence, as to which the plan pro-
posed to cure the arrearages over the life of the plan as provided in § 1322(b)(5). Enewally
[Vol. 45:10911104
CHAPTER 13 ALTERNATIVE
plan (as modified) proposed to strip off the unsecured claims on
the two rental properties, but not to change either the duration of
each loan or the interest rates.7 9 The bankruptcy court (pursuant
to an opinion written by the author herein) held that Chapter 13
permitted such a plan proposal for rental property because it did
not come within the exception of § 1322(b)(2)." The Ninth Circuit
upheld a reversal by the district court and found that Chapter 13
requires that all changes in a claim must include the payment in
full of the claim as changed over the life of the plan."
New § 1322(b)(6) is inspired by § 1123(a)(5)(H) in Chapter 11.82
Because Chapter 11 now includes the language of § 1322(b)(2)8 3 §
1123(a)(5)(H) is needed in Chapter 1184 to support the common
practice in Chapter 11 cases of modifying the duration, amount
and interest rate of a secured claim." Chapter 11 also authorizes
stripping the unsecured claim of an undersecured creditor in a
v. Wash. Nat. Bank (In re Enewally), 276 B.R. 643, 647-48 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002), affd
in part, rev'd in part, No. SA CV 02-459-GLT, 2002 WL 34178495 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26,
2002), aff'd, 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004).
79. In re Enewally, 276 B.R. at 645-46. Pursuant to the plan, the unsecured overage
claims in the rental properties would be discharged at the end of the plan, provided that
such a discharge was entered. Id. at 645.
80. See id. at 652-53.
81. See In re Enewally, 368 F.3d at 1172.
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a)(5)(H) (2006).
83. Compare id. § 1322(b)(2), with id. § 1123(b)(5) (same language in each provision).
84. Professor Mark Scarberry argues that Enewally prohibits stripping down a lien in
a Chapter 13 case even without the language in § 1322(b)(2). See Mark S. Scarberry, A
Critique of Congressional Proposals to Permit Modification of Home Mortgages in Chapter
13 Bankruptcy, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 635, 661-65 (2010). Professor Adam Levitin contends, in
his response to Professor Scarberry, that Enewally is a decision from only one circuit court
(albeit from the largest United States federal circuit) that does not establish national case
law, particularly since it has not been followed much. See Adam J. Levitin, Back to the Fu-
ture with Chapter 13: A Response to Professor Scarberry, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1261, 1267-69
(2010). This paper proposes the legislative overruling of Enewally to make clear that it
will no longer be good law anywhere after the Chapter 13 change proposed herein is legis-
latively adopted.
85. See Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram
Down, 14 CARDOzO L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1993). Stripping down the unsecured portion of an
undersecured creditor's claim is not permitted in a Chapter 7 case. See Dewsnup v. Timm,
502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). Section 1322(b)(2) has prohibited such an action in a Chapter 13
case since it went into force in 1979. See In re Enewally, 368 F.3d at 1171-72. However,
the practice has always been different in Chapter 11 cases.
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Chapter 11 plan. 6 It will have the same effect in a Chapter 13
case pursuant to the proposed change."
In order to avoid the strict time constraints for repayment re-
quired by Enewally, the best solution is the addition of a new
provision to Chapter 13 permitting the modification of the dura-
tion, amount, and interest rate of all secured claims.
The third change involves two technical amendments to § 1322,
both of which simply remove the extraneous references to the re-
pealed antimodification provision in § 1322(b)(2). Since amended
§ 1322(b)(2) will permit the modification of all contract rights, in-
cluding those resulting in the cure and reinstatement of a claim
secured by a principal residence, it is not necessary to include
language in § 1322(b)(5) to ensure that result. For that same rea-
son, § 1322(c) should also be identically amended.
D. Who Will Qualify to Use This Change
To qualify for mortgage modification under the amended Chap-
ter 13, a debtor would have to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case.
Chapter 13 has entry requirements that such a debtor must satis-
fy. First, there are debt ceilings that exclude creditors with too
much debt: a Chapter 13 debtor is disqualified if the debtor has
more than $1,081,400 in "noncontingent, liquidated, secured
86. See, e.g., First Fed. Bank of Ca. v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 227 B.R. 284, 290
n.4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing an established pre-1994 practice to permit a Chap-
ter 11 individual debtor to strip down an undersecured mortgage on the debtor's principal
residence); Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that Chapter 11
debtors could strip down lien on residence notwithstanding Dewsnup); In re Jones, 152
B.R. 155, 173 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (stating that a categorical prohibition on lien
stripping in Chapter 11 cases "would disrupt established pre-Code law"); cf. Harmon v.
United States ex rel. Farmers Home Admin., 101 F.3d 574, 581 (8th Cir. 1996) (allowing
lien stripping in a Chapter 12 case).
87. It could be argued that § 1123(b)(5) should also be repealed. However, there are
rather few Chapter 11 cases where a debtor seeks to strip down the unsecured portion of
an undersecured home loan. In the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, only 14,191
Chapter 11 cases were filed nationwide. See Bankruptcy Filings Up Nearly 14 Percent
Over Last Fiscal Year, U.S. COURTS (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/News
view/10-11-08/BankruptcyFilingsUp-Nearly_14_PerentOverLastFiscalYear.aspx.
However, only a small proportion of these cases involved individual debtors, id. tbl. F-2
(12-Month Period), and only a small portion of the individual debtor Chapter 11 cases in-
volved an issue of stripping down an undersecured home mortgage. Thus, this change in
Chapter 11 would have little impact on the existing home mortgage crisis.
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debts" and more than $360,475 in similar unsecured debts.88
Second, a Chapter 13 debtor must propose a plan that meets the
statutory requirements for confirmation." Third, and most im-
portant, the plan must be supported by a budget showing that the
debtor plans to live (with certain qualifications) within the spar-
tan restrictions that the Internal Revenue Service attempts to
impose on taxpayers to qualify for a plan to pay tax arrearages
over a period of time.o This would require that the debtor and the
debtor's family live at or near the poverty level for the life of the
plan.
Notably, this strip-down would not be available to debtors fil-
ing their cases under Chapter 7," the most popular chapter for
consumer debtors.9 2 Thus a debtor opting under Chapter 7 for a
clean slate and a fresh start as of the date of filing the bankrupt-
cy petition (after turning over all non-exempt property to the
trustee for liquidation for the benefit of creditors)" would not be
eligible for this treatment for her home.94
E. The Benefits of this Change in Chapter 13
The most important benefit of such a change in Chapter 13, for
our discussion here, is that it restricts the losses in the consumer
real estate market to the private sector and insulates the gov-
ernment purse from these losses. The government does not con-
tribute any funding to achieving this result. The costs of the
Chapter 13 system are carried by the U.S. court system, supple-
88. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West 2011). These statutory ceilings are adjusted for infla-
tion every three years. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (Supp. III 2009). The last such adjustment was
made effective April 1, 2010. See id.
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
90. See id. § 1325(b)(3); see also id. § 707(b)(2)(A)-(B) (discussing when granting relief
by dismissing a case under Chapters 11 or 13 would constitute abuse).
91. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417, 420 (1992) (holding that a Chapter 7
debtor cannot strip down an undersecured claim that "is secured by a lien and has been
fully allowed pursuant to § 502").
92. Chapter 7 accounts for approximately 70% of consumer bankruptcies. Robert J.
Landry, III, An Empirical Analysis of the Causes of Consumer Bankruptcy: Will Bankrupt-
cy Reform Really Change Anything?, 3 RUTGERS Bus. L.J. 2, 8 (2006).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
94. A Chapter 7 trustee would not sell a debtor's home if the secured creditor was un-
dersecured, because the creditor would be entitled to all of the value in the house and
there would be no benefit for the unsecured creditors. Instead, in due course the trustee
would abandon the property back to the debtor. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 6007.
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mented by filing fees (court costs) and a percentage payment to
the Chapter 13 trustee who administers the case (administration
costs). Private losses in the residential real estate market, if any,
remain private and do not drain the public treasury.
This proposal has two additional important features. First, for
a Chapter 13 debtor who can afford the payments under the re-
structured loan, the debtor can keep the home and make afforda-
ble payments to the lender (or its successor). The debtor does not
incur the loss of the home or the impact of a foreclosure on the
debtor's credit report, and the debtor can get on with her life."
At the same time, Chapter 13 is cheaper for the lender." The
lender is much more likely to be paid." A court-approved repay-
ment plan providing for the payment of reduced mortgage pay-
ments is likely to result in payments to the secured creditor. The
present value of the stream of payments under the plan will most
likely substantially exceed the amount that a bank can realize
from reselling the property after foreclosure (which must be dis-
counted for the delay in the foreclosure process and in the resale
process)." The lender likely receives no payments during the fo-
reclosure process and certainly receives none during the delay be-
tween foreclosure and resale of the residence." In addition, the
lender does not incur the costs and administrative burden of own-
ing and marketing the property, almost surely at a loss, or of re-
cognizing this loss on its balance sheet.oo
This change in bankruptcy law also solves the contractual,
practical, and economic problems resulting from the securitiza-
tion of the vast majority of home mortgages. The bankruptcy so-
lution solves the collective action problem that prevents mortgage
owners from finding an economic solution to a mortgage afforda-
bility problem. In addition, under mortgage securitization, mort-
gage servicers are typically the only parties who have any author-
95. The costs to a debtor of foreclosure are usually substantial. The debtor suffers a
loss of community ties, friendships, religious affiliation, "schooling, childcare, medical
care, transportation, and even employment." Levitin, supra note 15, at 569.
96. See id. at 610-11.
97. See id. at 607.
98. See id. at 606-07.
99. See id. at 629.
100. See id. at 606. Foreclosure imposes larger losses on lenders, on the average, than
bankruptcy modification of their loans. See id. at 618; see also Levitin, supra note 69, at 7.
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ity to act on behalf of mortgage holders, and the servicers are typ-
ically prohibited by contract from making loan modifications, or
their right to make such modifications is severely limited."'o The
servicers lack sufficient personnel to handle a large number of
consumer contacts and lack the financial resources to hire such
personnel. In addition, in many cases, foreclosure is more profita-
ble to loan servicers than modification of a loan. 102 All of these
problems disappear immediately for loans modified pursuant to
the proposed Chapter 13 change.
Furthermore, such a program makes good politics. Because
such a program would reduce the incentives for a homeowner to
abandon the property, the community bears a smaller burden of
vacant houses, loss of property taxes, and the failure of the resi-
dents to maintain their properties and to support and contribute
to community life.10 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The principal purpose of this article is to specify the changes
needed in Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to put into
place a Chapter 13 solution for the home ownership problem in
the United States. This solution is both simple and elegant: delete
from § 1322(b)(2) the phrase "other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal res-
idence." A second change incorporates language from §
1123(a)(5)(H) to make it explicit that a Chapter 13 plan may ex-
tend the maturity date and change the interest rate and other
terms of a debt instrument. Third, some minor technical changes
would implement these alterations.
As the foreclosure crisis continues to deepen, modification of
certain underwater mortgages under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code can make a substantial contribution to the stabiliza-
tion of the housing market. Unlike any other existing or proposed
solutions to the problem, "bankruptcy modification offers imme-
diate relief, solves the market problems created by securitization,
101. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 69, at 5.
102. See id.
103. See Levitin, supra note 15, at 569 (discussing the costs foreclosure can have for
third parties).
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addresses both problems of payment-reset shock and negative eq-
uity, screens out speculators, spreads burdens between borrowers
and lenders, and avoids both the costs and moral hazard of a gov-
ernment bailout."1 0 4 Thus, while the bankruptcy solution is not a
magic bullet, "it is a quick, fair, efficient, and administrable re-
sponse that would help stabilize the housing market and prevent
the deadweight social and economic losses of foreclosure."10 5
Most importantly, this solution can be accomplished at no cost
to the federal government or any other governmental agency.
Like all bankruptcy law, the costs of this solution rest entirely on
the private sector (and rest principally on those responsible for
bringing on the housing crisis).
104. Id. at 647-48.
105. Levitin, supra note 69, at 9.
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